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REDEFINING "MEDICAL CARE"
Lauren R. Roth*
President Donald J. Trump has said he will repeal the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) and replace it with health savings accounts (HSAs).
Conservatives have long preferred individual accounts to meet social
welfare needs instead of more traditional entitlement programs. The
types of "medical care" that can be reimbursed through an HSA are
listed in § 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and include ex-
penses "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body."
In spite of the broad language, regulations and court interpretations
have narrowed this definition substantially. It does not include the many
social factors that determine health outcomes. Though the United States
spends over seventeen percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on
"healthcare", the country's focus on the traditional medicalized model
of health results in overall population health that is far beneath the re-
sults of other countries that spend significantly less.
Precision medicine is one exceptional way in which American
healthcare has focused more on individuals instead of providing broad,
one-size-fits-all medical care. The precision medicine movement calls
for using the genetic code of individuals to both predict future illness and
to target treatments for current illnesses. Yet the definition of "medical
care" under the Code remains the same for all.
My proposal for precision healthcare accounts involves two steps-
the first of which requires permitting physicians to write prescriptions
for a broader range of goods and services. The social determinants of
health are as important to health outcomes as are surgical procedures
and drugs-or perhaps more so according to many population health
studies. The second step requires agencies and courts to interpret what
constitutes "medical care" under the Code differently depending on the
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taxpayer's income level. Childhood sports programs and payments for
fruits and vegetables may be covered for those in the lower income
brackets who could not otherwise afford these items and would not
choose to spend scarce resources on them if they could. This all assumes
that the government takes funds previously used to subsidize the
purchase of health insurance under the ACA (or allocates new funds)
and puts the funds in individual accounts so the poor or near poor have
money to pay for these expenses.
Section I of this Article will explore the current definition of medical
care, which excludes the social determinants of health from "health-
care" spending. I then address how precision medicine has changed the
types of services and treatments that it makes sense to reimburse for each
individual. If efficacy can vary from person to person based on genetic
code, then it also can vary depending on environment. There is an op-
portunity to not only vary the types of "medical care" that can be reim-
bursed or deducted within the traditional range of services and drugs,
but also outside of that range.
Section II addresses the historical shift towards health financing
through individual accounts, and specifically through HSAs. If this is the
only avenue for health reform in the next few years, I advocate using it to
engage in the type of experiments that are typically only possible under
the cover of tax expenditures. My proposal for precision healthcare ac-
counts moves the government to experiment with individual social spend-
ing that can lead to improved overall health outcomes.
Finally, in Section III, I address two dichotomies that affect any
healthcare proposal: (1) entitlement programs v. grants-in-aid, and (2)
pooled insurance v. consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs). In the end,
I argue that an entitlement method of funding precision HSAs along with
pooled insurance subsidized by the government is the most realistic reso-
lution to these dichotomies. Only a broad-based entitlement to funding
for all healthcare expenses (medical and social) allows for significant
improvements in overall population health.
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INTRODUCTION
President Donald J. Trump has repeatedly called the Affordable
Care Act (ACA or Obamacare) a failure and pressed for it to be repealed
and replaced "with a solution that includes Health Savings Accounts
(HSAs)."' In fact, in his campaign speech at Gettysburg, Trump empha-
sized the centrality of HSAs to his efforts to repeal the ACA when he
stated that he would "[flully repeal Obamacare and replace it with health
savings accounts." 2 Both the American Health Care Act passed by the
House of Representatives and the failed Better Care Reconciliation Act
Senate bill included a larger role for HSAs through increased contribu-
tion limits and flexibility regarding what the money can be used for and
when.3 In spite of the failure of recent efforts by congressional Republi-
cans, President Trump's administration is still focused on repealing the
ACA. 4
Former Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price favored
revamping Medicaid and Medicare so "both programs would cease to be
entitlements that require them to provide coverage to every person who
qualifies."5 Entitlement "reform" is on the Trump administration's
agenda in spite of his earlier campaign promises not to cut entitlement
I The Transition Team, Healthcare, GREAT AGAIN (Dec. 13, 2016), https://greatagain.
gov/healthcare-396f348e51ef#.xxb9yw8iq. Trump's plan also includes shifting more power
over health insurance to the states. Id.
2 PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, Nov. 16, 2016, 2016 WLNR 34567182 (quot-
ing then-Republican candidate for president Donald J. Trump, Contract with the American
Voter (Oct. 22, 2016)).
3 H.R. 1628, American Health Care Act of 2017, https://www.congress.govlbill/l 15th-
congress/house-bill/1628; Better Care Reconciliation Act, https://www.budget.senate.gov/bet
tercare. The bills proposed nearly doubling contribution limits to $5,000 for single coverage
and $10,000 for family coverage to coincide with out-of-pocket limits, allowing both spouses
to make catch up contributions to one HSA, paying for expenses incurred up to 60 days before
HSA-related coverage takes effect, paying for over-the-counter medications (not allowed
under the ACA), and reducing the tax penalty when money is used for unqualified expenses to
10% from 20%. Id. Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the cost of these pro-
posals at $19 billion through 2026. Tom Anderson, Senate's Obamacare replacement bill will
likely boost health savings accounts, CNBC, June 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/201 7 /06 /
21/senates-health-care-bill-will-likely-boost-health-savings-accounts.html.
4 See, e.g., Trump says he just wants Mitch McConnell "to get repeal and replace
done", CBS, Aug. 10, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-again-pushes-mitch-mccon
nell-to-pass-health-care-legislation/.
5 Greg Sargent, Opinion, Get Ready for a Big, Messy, Explosive Battle over Medicare's
Future, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/
2016/11/29/get- ready-for-a-big-messy-explosive-battle-over-medicares-future/?utmterm=.e
65618935d93.
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programs. 6 Although Congress has been unable to repeal the ACA to
this point, Congress remains closely divided. It is likely that if entitle-
ment reform passes Congress, it will also include a role for individual
accounts.
HSAs are individual accounts that must be paired with a high de-
ductible health plan (HDHP). Both employers and employees can con-
tribute to the HSAs up to a specified amount. Regardless of whether
those contributions are sufficient to fund basic healthcare needs, the
more traditional health insurance coverage does not begin until expenses
surpass the deductible-although there is an exception for basic, prevent-
ative care, which may be covered before the deductible is reached. Thus,
depending on the amount of employer contributions, employees may face
thousands of dollars of unreimburseable medical expenses each year.
The types of "medical care" that can be reimbursed through an HSA
are listed in § 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).7 Among
other items listed, "medical care" includes expenses "for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body." The definition was
originally crafted for a tax deduction that applies when individual tax-
payers' medical expenses exceed a set threshold that few taxpayers
meet-now ten percent of gross income.9 As the use of individual ac-
counts in health financing grew, Congress applied the definition of
"medical care" in § 213(d) more broadly to flexible spending accounts,
health reimbursement arrangements, medical savings accounts, and
HSAs.
The definition of "medical care" under the Code remains the same
for all and includes mainly traditional medical treatments. Although re-
search has shown that the social determinants of health play a large role
in population health (perhaps larger than those played by physicians,
hospitals, and drugs), medical care does not include spending on these
social factors that can improve health.
6 Richard Rubin & Laura Meckler, Trump Adviser Says He's Open to Entitlement Pro-
gram Changes, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-adviser-says-
hes-open-to-entitlement-program-changes-1462997756 (detailing Trump's flip flop from say-
ing in his campaign kickoff speech that he planned to "save Medicare, Medicaid and Social
Security without cuts" to an apparent willingness to cut spending on Medicare and Social
Security if his forecasted budget surpluses do not appear); see also Paul Krugman, Opinion,
The Medicare Killers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/20l6/l1/18/opin-
ion/the-medicare-killers.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=
0("[All indications are that the incoming administration is getting ready to kill Medicare,
replacing it with vouchers that can be applied to the purchase of private insurance. Oh, and
it's also likely to raise the age of Medicare eligibility.").
7 26 U.S.C. § 213(d).
8 Id. § 213(d)(1)(A).
9 Id. § 213(a). The threshold prior to January 1, 2013 was 7.5%. See id. § 213(f).
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Perhaps the funds in your account can be used for an experimental
new cancer treatment, or perhaps not. Perhaps they can be used for re-
constructive surgery after a mastectomy, or perhaps not. What is clear is
that the funds in your account cannot be used to pay for a babysitter to
help with your kids while you recover from surgery or an afterschool
program for your children.
Recently, the medical profession has focused more on individuals
instead of providing broad, one-size-fits-all medical care. The precision
medicine movement calls for using the genetic code of individuals to
both predict future illness and to target treatments of current illnesses.
Although still in its infancy, precision medicine has resulted in Angelina
Jolie and many other women undergoing preventive surgery to remove
their breasts, ovaries, and fallopian tubes. There are regular reports of
new cancer breakthroughs using immunotherapy to target tumors with
particular genetic mutations.
If you are not a wealthy individual who can afford to look into your
genetic code and act accordingly, however, healthcare spending is not
sufficient to meet all of your health needs. The narrow definition of
medical care under § 213(d) prevents you from making small improve-
ments that would have a big impact on your health. For example, the
funds in your account cannot be used to pay for an afterschool sports
program that will help prevent your child from being obese and develop-
ing diabetes. Nor can they be used to pay for fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles-not to mention the organic apples that those with higher incomes
prefer.
Just as medicine is recognizing that health outcomes can be im-
proved by personalizing treatments, the expensive, tax-subsidized system
of health financing in this country needs to recognize that health out-
comes can be improved by personalized spending. Individual accounts
are well-suited for this one purpose, at least. Individuals make decisions
about how to spend the money within the bounds of § 213(d). The ques-
tion then is what a personalized definition of medical care would look
like and how it would be implemented. Using resources to fund million-
aires' nanny salaries or vacations does not seem like a wise decision.
Conservatives have long favored using individual accounts to meet
social welfare needs instead of more traditional entitlement programs.
Entitlements are government funded programs that provide benefits to all
who meet the eligibility criteria. Government funded programs that are
unconnected to work, such as welfare and the ACA, have been stigma-
tized as "unearned" benefits while Social Security and unemployment
insurance programs are considered a safety net for those who have
2017] 69
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worked hard and "earned" their benefits.10 The American ethos of indi-
vidual responsibility and small government has resulted in the idea that
only the lazy would seek a government "handout"-unless it is indirectly
funded through tax expenditures and received through an employer, of
course.I
The majority of Americans feel passionately entitled (in the subjec-
tive sense) to their Social Security benefits and to their employer-spon-
sored health insurancel 2-which is heavily subsidized by foregone tax
revenue. To many Americans, individual accounts fit with this more so-
cially acceptable form of entitlement. Whether the money is used to
fund retirement or health benefits, individuals either contribute or are
given by employers a sum of tax-subsidized money-a defined contribu-
tion-to use as they wish. Individuals then bear two risks with individ-
ual accounts: (1) to the extent that employers do not contribute to the
accounts at all or contribute little, employees now pay some or all of the
cost of funding health benefits previously covered by traditional health
insurance plans; and (2) employees bear the responsibility for rationally
deciding what and how much to spend the funds on.1 3 Traditionally,
employers had a more paternalistic role of defining and funding the ben-
efits that employees most needed.
My proposal for personalized, or precision HSAs involves first per-
mitting physicians to write prescriptions (a requirement for medical care
covered under § 213(d)14) for a broader range of goods and services.
The social determinants of health are as important to health outcomes as
are surgical procedures and drugs-few of which have been proven ef-
fective through rigorous scientific studies anyway.
Second, items which can be considered "medical care" under the
Code will depend on your income level. Childhood sports programs and
payments for fruits and vegetables may be covered for those in the
lower-income brackets who could not otherwise afford these items and
would not choose to spend scarce resources on them if they could. Simi-
10 See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1998).
11 See generally CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DE-
BUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POL'Y (2007).
12 See generally Lauren R. Roth, Overvaluing Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 63
U. KAN. L. REV. 633 (2015).
13 See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSE-
CURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2008) [hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT
RISK SHIFT].
14 Although I believe that the requirement under § 213(d) that physicians write prescrip-
tions for items to be covered by the definition of "medical care"-and the courts' emphasis on
this factor in classifying expenditures-should be changed to also permit nurses and commu-
nity health workers to write prescriptions to cover items under § 213(d), that topic is beyond
the scope of this Article and hopefully the subject of a subsequent project.
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larly, the cost of an exterminator to reduce pests in an apartment with a
child with asthma and a reticent landlord would also be covered.
This all assumes that the government takes funds previously used to
subsidize the purchase of insurance under the ACA (or allocates new
funds) and puts the funds in these accounts so the poor or near poor have
money to pay for basic expenses. Even if the government simply pro-
motes the expansion of HSAs in the workplace in place of traditional
health insurance, however, many of the working poor will find them-
selves relying on HSAs and HDHPs.
In Section I of this Article, I address how narrow the current defini-
tion of "medical care" under the Internal Revenue Code is. Much of our
longevity and quality of life is determined by social factors that correlate
strongly with income, such as housing and education. Yet § 213(d) fol-
lows the traditional medicalized model of "healthcare" and excludes ex-
penditures that are closely correlated with health outcomes. Precision
medicine, however, is one example of how medical care has become per-
sonalized, resulting in different types of services and treatments that
should be reimbursed. If the efficacy of prevention efforts and treat-
ments can vary from person to person based on genetic code, then it also
can vary based on environment. There is an opportunity to not only tai-
lor the types of "medical care" that can be reimbursed or deducted within
the traditional range of services and drugs, but also outside of that range.
Section II explores the historical movement towards health financ-
ing through individual accounts, and specifically through HSAs. While
employers have slowly been shifting increasing healthcare costs to em-
ployees through co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles (such as
those of the HDHPs), if that is the only avenue for health reform in the
next few years, I advocate using it to engage in the type of experiments
that are not typically possible except under the cover of tax expenditures.
HSAs, if they are funded properly for those with low incomes, can be
used to fund improvements in the social factors that affect health out-
comes-and while the aim would be to improve overall population
health individual by individual, they can be customized to the needs of
the account holders.
Finally, in Section III, I will discuss two dichotomies that affect my
proposal and most health-related proposals today: entitlements v. grants-
in-aid and pooled insurance v. consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs).
Entitlements have a stigma that regularly results in calls for "reform."
Americans typically agree that the government should pay some amount
for the basic needs of the poor but value choice (including the choices of
states) and individual responsibility. In recent decades, federal entitle-
ments have moved towards broad block grants, or grants-in-aid, that al-
low states to decide how to spend the fixed sum designated for the health
2017] 71
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needs of the poor. The ACA's Medicaid expansion changed that, but
Republican efforts will likely mean a return to that form of aid to the
states-instead of directly to those in need.
Finally, greater reliance on individual accounts calls into question
the role of traditional, pooled insurance. While people generally use in-
surance only for unplanned, catastrophic expenses (which is what
HDHPs are designed to cover), health insurance in this country has, up
until recently, included a pre-payment for routine, preventive care that is
predictable and will not bankrupt the consumer. This is part of the rea-
son that Americans have balked at increasing co-payments, co-insurance,
and deductibles. Including routine social expenditures within the defini-
tion of medical care for some will only take Americans further from the
typical purpose of insurance. Yet a traditional, pooled insurance model
also focuses on using the healthy to subsidize the sick. Expanding the
definition of medical care only increases the level of expenditures if it is
not offset by equivalent cost savings.
I. MEDICAL CARE
In "healthcare" financing, there is widespread disagreement over
where to focus spending. The issue does not seem to be the need for
additional spending; the U.S. spends 17.6% of gross domestic product
(GDP) on "healthcare", which is roughly double the average for compa-
rable countries.' 5 Yet, there seems to be a mismatch between spending
and health outcomes. Senator Edward Kennedy wrote just before his
death in 2009, "Despite spending more per capita than any other nation
in the world, the United States is ranked 37th by the World Health Or-
ganization in terms of health outcomes."' 6 More spending on "health-
care" does not necessarily improve health outcomes then.' 7
I argue here that the problem is that the United States is spending
too much on "medical care" (in spite of its frequent use of the word
"healthcare") and not enough on healthcare-leading to substandard
health outcomes. Broadly speaking, medical care is any diagnosis or
treatment by a professional, such as a physician or nurse, of a current or
15 PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AM. STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH
CARE REFORM 1 (2013) ("In 1970, when the uninsured were a considerably smaller fraction of
the population, healthcare costs in the United States were much closer to the levels in western
Europe and Canada.... In the following years, however, as the underlying problems of health
coverage and costs became more severe, the attempts to remedy them generated more rancor-
ous partisan divisions.").
16 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Health Care as a Basic Hum. Right: Moving from Lip
Serv. to Reality, 22 HARV. Hum. RTs. J. 165, 167 (2009).
17 See Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 93 n.27 (2011) (surveying research that indicates more
is not always better in terms of healthcare spending).
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future illness or injury. Healthcare, on the other hand, is any attempt to
improve the health of a person, including both increasing longevity and
enhancing quality of life. While medical care typically takes place in a
hospital or physician's office, healthcare frequently starts at home with a
change in lifestyle. Funding to promote small changes in eating habits or
exercise, for example, can do more to improve individual and population
health than a new drug or medical procedure-particularly for those with
low incomes who have shorter lifespans and poor quality of life com-
pared to those with higher incomes.
Yet American spending on medical care far outstrips spending on
healthcare-much of which is covered by social welfare programs that
provide a basic income level in other countries. One example of this is
the definition of "medical care" under Internal Revenue Code § 213(d),
which originally allowed individuals to deduct unreimbursed medical ex-
penses above a high threshold (now 10 percent of gross income), but
later was incorporated into health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs),
flexible spending arrangements (FSAs), medical savings accounts
(MSAs), and HSAs.' 8 As the statements of President Trump indicate,
HSAs are a likely focus of healthcare reform proposals over the next few
years. Any growth of HSAs in number or total dollars invested means an
increased impact for the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS's) definition of
medical care since funds in'HSAs can only be used without penalty for
expenses that qualify as medical care under § 213(d). Without changes
to this definition, and to "healthcare" financing broadly, the United
States will make little progress towards improving overall population
health because spending on medical care is much less efficient than
spending on healthcare.
A. Current Definition of Medical Care
Under § 213(d)(1): "The term 'medical care' means amounts paid-
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of dis-
ease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred
to in subparagraph (A)" or certain other long-term care or insurance ser-
vices. Covered medicines and drugs must be prescribed by a physi-
cian.' 9 In addition:
18 Jessica A. Bejerea, Note, It is Not too Late for the Health Savings Account, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 721, 733 (2010) (noting that consumer driven health care (CDHC) made
§ 213(d) "the foundation" of these individual account laws).
19 See 26 U.S.C. § 213(b) (limiting deduction for medicine and drugs to "prescribed
drugs"); id. § 213(d)(3) (defining "prescribed drug" as "a drug or biological which requires a
prescription of a physician for its use").
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[almounts paid for lodging (not lavish or extravagant
under the circumstances) while away from home prima-
rily for and essential to medical care referred to in para-
graph (1)(A) shall be treated as amounts paid for medical
care if-(A) the medical care referred to in paragraph
(1)(A) is provided by a physician in a licensed hospital
(or in a medical care facility which is related to, or the
equivalent of, a licensed hospital), and (B) there is no
significant element of personal pleasure, recreation, or
vacation in the travel away from home. 2 0
The regulations clarify that expenses for legal "operations or treatments
affecting any portion of the body, including obstetrical expenses and ex-
penses of therapy or X-ray treatments" are "for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body." 2 1 Included within medical care
are "hospital services, nursing services (including nurses' board where
paid by the taxpayer), medical, laboratory, surgical, dental and other di-
agnostic and healing services, X-rays, medicine and drugs . . . , artificial
teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire." 2 2 Yet there is a specific exclusion
for expenses which are "merely beneficial to the general health of an
individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation." 23
The Code also allows taxpayers to deduct part or all of the cost of
residential improvements made for medical reasons. If the improvement
increases the value of the residence, then the deduction is reduced by the
amount that the value of the residence increases. 2 4 A capital expenditure
can qualify as a deductible medical expense where "it has as its primary
purpose the medical care" of the taxpayer, her spouse, or her dependent
and "is related only to the sick person and is not related to permanent
improvement or betterment of property." 25 Examples provided include
payments for "eye glasses, a seeing eye dog, artificial teeth and limbs, a
wheel chair, crutches, an inclinator or an air conditioner which is de-
tachable from the property and purchased only for the use of a sick per-
son."2 6 A "permanent improvement" to the property can also qualify as
a medical expense if related to medical care to the extent that the pay-
20 Id. § 213(d)(2) ("The amount taken into account under the preceding sentence shall
not exceed $50 for each night for each individual.").
21 26 C.F.R. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(ii).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See id. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(iii); Rev. Rul. 87-106, 1987-2 C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 83-33, 1983-
1 C.B. 70; Robert K. Lu, Note, Gross Negl. and the Med. Expense Deduction, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 848 (1998) (noting that swimming pools are frequently deductible when built for
medical reasons).
25 26 C.F.R. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(iii).
26 Id. (emphasis added).
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ment "exceeds the increase in the value of the related property." 27 The
example provided is a situation where a doctor suggests that the taxpayer
"install an elevator in his residence so that the taxpayer's wife who is
afflicted with heart disease will not be required to climb stairs." 2 8 To be
clear then, the IRS does not want any other family member's health to be
improved by access to an air conditioner, but the taxpayer will be fully
compensated for installing an elevator by either an increase in property
value or a tax deduction, and the entire family can use the elevator.
Transportation expenses are only deductible as medical care if they
are "primarily for and essential to the rendition of the medical care," and
meals and lodging are not generally deductible when traveling to im-
prove health. 2 9 "For example, if a doctor prescribes that a taxpayer go to
a warm climate in order to alleviate a specific chronic ailment," transpor-
tation, meals, and lodging are not deductible under § 213(d). 30
Finally, institutional care due to a medical condition is deductible,
including meals and lodging. Examples include institutionalization of
the mentally ill and certain educational expenses. 3' As the regulations
state, "While ordinary education is not medical care, the cost of medical
care includes the cost of attending a special school for a mentally or
physically handicapped individual, if his condition is such that the re-
sources of the institution for alleviating such mental or physical handicap
are a principal reason for his presence there." 3 2 It is clear from these
regulations that the IRS does not allow a tax deduction for educational
expenses designed to compensate for the social determinants of health
that result in poor educational performance, such as poor housing and
lack of access to proper nutrition (or even private school tuition).
Courts interpreting § 213's deduction and the corresponding regula-
tions have noted the two basic prongs covering expenses for: (1) the "di-
agnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease" and (2)
"the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body." 3 3 As
explained by the Tax Court in Jacobs v. Commissioner,3 4 the deduction
27 Id.
28 Id. ("If, however, by reason of this expenditure, it is determined that the value of the
residence has not been increased, the entire cost of installing the elevator would qualify as a
medical expense.").
29 C.F.R. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(iv).
30 Id. (noting that where "travel is undertaken merely for the general improvement of a
taxpayer's health," neither transportation nor meals and lodging are deductible).
31 26 C.F.R. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(v)(a).
32 Id. § 1.213-1 (e)(1)(v)(a) ("Thus, the cost of medical care includes the cost of attending
a special school . . . in order to qualify the individual for future normal education or for normal
living.").
33 O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34, 49 (2010) (permitting deduction for hormone
therapy and gender reassignment surgery to treat gender identity disorder).
34 Jacobs v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 813 (1974).
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for medical care is an exception to the general prohibition on deductions
for "personal, living, or family expenses" under § 262 of the Code.35
"The two sections must be read in conjunction when determining the
deductibility of any given expense." 36
Under the framework used in Jacobs, the first step for an expense to
fall under the § 213 deduction is to "show the present existence or immi-
nent probability of a disease, defect, or illness."3 7 Next, the payment
"must be for goods or services directly or proximately related to the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of the disease or ill-
ness." 3 8 The heart of the issue typically relates to expenses which could
be considered either medical or personal and is fact intensive.39
Where the expense is not solely a medical one, "many factors, such
as the taxpayer's purpose or motive, the effect of purchased goods or
services on the illness, and the origin of the expense, have been consid-
ered relevant." 40 A doctor's prescription is not dispositive but is a factor
to be considered, as is any "improvement" in health. One key element is
a "but for" test where the taxpayer must show that "the expenditures
were an essential element of the treatment and that they would not have
otherwise been incurred for nonmedical reasons." 4 '
Examples of expenses denied because taxpayers could not meet this
"but for" test include fees related to a divorce recommended by a psychi-
atrist and expenses of spending the summer on the water and winter in
Arizona after a coronary illness. 4 2 Yet in Urbauer v. Commissioner,4 3
the taxpayers were allowed to deduct costs of enrolling their son in a
college-preparatory school as a result of drug and behavioral problems,
including tuition, room, board, airfare and rental cars to and from the
school for therapy sessions, and an allowance account. Because the edu-
35 26 U.S.C. § 262 (1988); Jacobs, 62 T.C. at 817-18 ("The section does not make medi-
cal expenses nonpersonal; it merely carves a limited exception out of [§] 262 for those ex-
penses which fall within its terms.").
36 Id. at 818.
3' Id.
38 Id.
39 Jacobs, 62 T.C. at 819 ("There would seem to be little doubt that the expense con-
nected with items which are wholly medical in nature and which serve no other legitimate
function in everyday life is incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation of disease. On
the other hand, it is obvious that many expenses are so personal in nature that they may only in
rare situations lose their identity as ordinary personal expenses and acquire deductibility as
amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or alleviation of disease.").
40 Jacobs, 62 T.C. at 819.
41 Id. (finding that § 213 should be narrowly construed).
42 See Susan L. Megaard, Scope of the Med. Expense Deduction Clarified and Broad-
ened by New Tax Court Decision, 112 J. TAX'N 353, 362 (2010).
43 Urbauer v. Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2492 (1992).
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cational expenses "are incidental to the special services provided by the
school," they are deductible. 44
Less is known about the meaning of the second prong relating to
expenses affecting the structures or functions of the body, although the
IRS has allowed deductions for items such as a vasectomy, an abortion,
birth control pills, infertility treatments, and eye surgeries to correct
vision.45
B. Exclusion of Healthcare
Americans tend to think of health in terms of illness and visits to
doctors and hospitals.46 Yet research supports the idea that the social
determinants of health-the "contexts in which people live, learn, work
and play"-have a large impact on health.4 7 Notably, even if the U.S.
had a single payor healthcare system with free healthcare for all, social
factors would continue to depress population health.4 8
The basic fact drawn from research on the social determinants of
health is that those with higher levels of family income live longer. 4 9
While research about inequality in the U.S. tends to focus on race, class
is a key component of poor health and social outcomes. In a more une-
qual society, even the richest do not fare as well as the richest in more
equal societies-resulting in shorter life spans. "Inequality evidently
pulls everyone down."5 0
While researchers do not fully understand the process through
which lower incomes result in poor health outcomes, some speculate that
a lack of "basic resources," particularly during childhood, and the related
stress from not meeting essential needs, causes the poor health
outcomes..5
Globally, countries are focused on improving the social determi-
nants of health that result from income inequality as a moral imperative
44 Id.
45 See Megaard, supra note 42, at 364 ("O'Donnabhain provides partial support for de-
ductibility where a procedure not only treats a disease but also promotes a bodily structure or
function.").
46 Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Pub.
Health Law Res. Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2011) (noting that Americans
acknowledge the importance of social influences on health "when primed" (citation omitted)).
47 Id. at 1649 (quoting Paula A. Braveman et al., Broadening the Focus: The Need to
Address the Soc. Determinants of Health, 40 Am. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S1, S5 (2011)).
48 Id. at 1651.
49 Id. at 1652-53 (noting that social epidemiologists call this correlation "the gradient" or
"the tendency of health outcomes to line up on a steady slope from the have-leasts to the have-
mosts").
50 Id. at 1653 (arguing that Americans have a shorter life span than the Swedes or Japa-
nese because of greater income inequality).
51 Burris at 1653-54.
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and to improve health outcomes. 5 2 In 2005, the Director General of the
World Health Organization, Dr. J.W. Lee, created the Commission on
Social Determinants of Health. As part of its mission, the Commission
aimed to "shift global health from a biomedical model to a social model,
which includes social and political conditions."53
The Commission's recommendations include universal access to
healthcare, but they also include reducing the "inequitable distribution of
power, money, and resources, which constitute the structural drivers of
health." 54 The Commission recommended that countries consider the
impact of all policy proposals on health equity.5 5 Two commissioners
specifically recommended that the U.S. "improve population health,
without spending more money on health, by focusing on social determi-
nants of health." 56
The law is a key component in establishing social inequality be-
cause it (1) "helps structure and perpetuate the social conditions that we
describe as 'social determinants'," and (2) turns social institutions "into
levels and distributions of health."5 7 As a result, Emily Parento has ar-
gued that "coercive legal mechanisms such as direct regulation and taxa-
tion are essential to a serious strategy to reduce disparities."58 Health
enables individuals and segments of the population to "fully participate
in society" by working, socializing, enjoying their families, being politi-
cally active, and maintaining a satisfying life.59
While not all health inequalities can be fixed, many are susceptible
to intervention.60 Yet the debate over the place of the law in advancing
public health typically focuses on choosing between "paternalism and
autonomy-that is, between government's right or obligation to enact
52 Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, Global Health Law Norms and the PPACA Framework
to Eliminate Health Disparities, 55 How. L.J. 887, 905 (2012).
53 Id. at 905-06 (noting that the Commission was created as an entity independent of the
WHO, and its twenty commissioners promote health equity around the world).
54 Id. at 906-07.
55 Id. at 907.
56 Id. at 908-09 (explaining that a focus on the social determinants of health "would
likely be far less costly" than fixing the issues with American healthcare).
57 Id. supra note 46, at 1655-56.
58 Emily Whelan Parento, Health Equity, Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal
Mechanisms as Necessary for the Achievement of Both, 58 Lov. L. REV. 655, 659, 662 (2012)
(discussing how any argument to use legal coercion to achieve health equity relies on the
human right to health, first stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
restated in the World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution: "[lhe enjoyment of the high-
est attainable standard of health . . . without distinction of race, religion, political belief, eco-
nomic or social condition" (alteration in original) (quoting World Health Organization [WHO],
Constitution of the World Health Organization, at 1 (Oct. 2006), http://www.who.int/govem-
ance/eb/whoconstitutionen.pdf)).
59 Id. at 664.
60 See id. at 667-68 (noting the theory that intervention is necessary where it is possible
to have an impact on the disparity in health outcomes).
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laws that either circumscribe individual autonomy (e.g., helmet laws) or
shift the decision-making paradigm toward more desired choices (e.g.,
tobacco taxes) versus an individual's freedom to engage in conduct not
immediately and directly harmful to others." 6 1 Regardless of philosophi-
cal debates over the virtues of freedom over paternalism, a hands-off
approach results in greater harm to those with lower incomes. 62
In the U.S., any decision for the government to intervene to advance
public health also raises the question of which government should inter-
vene-the federal government or states and municipalities. While states
have broad police power over the population's health and welfare and
Congress must typically rely on the Commerce Clause, greater federal
resources (including a broad tax base) at times mandate federal
involvement. 6 3
C. Case Study of Precision Medicine
One component of the movement to improve the social determi-
nants of health is the precision medicine movement (also called personal-
ized medicine). What a focus on social determinants attempts to do for a
community or population, precision medicine instead attempts to accom-
plish for the individual-more personalized care to improve health out-
comes. However, where lawmakers and the medical community have
been receptive to precision medicine because it fits the medicalized
model of healthcare, they have been insufficiently focused on achieving
improved health outcomes through the home and through local
institutions.
A 2013 report from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) be-
gins its definition of precision medicine with a quote from Hippocrates:
"It's far more important to know what person the disease has than what
disease the person has." 6 4 Although scientists have observed for years
the varying responses of different individuals to medical treatments, it
was the sequencing of the genome that allowed for the practice of preci-
sion medical diagnosis and treatment. 6 5
61 Id. at 677.
62 Id. ("Law is an essential tool in reducing health inequity because it is axiomatic that a
laissez-faire system disadvantages those individuals with less education, fewer resources, and
less political power.").
63 Id. at 679.
64 FDA, PAVING THE WAY FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA's ROLE IN A NEw ERA OF
MEDICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 5 (Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Paving the Way], http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PrecisionMedicine/UCM 3 7 2 4 2 1.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2017). Precision medicine is also called "personalized medicine," "strati-
fied medicine," "targeted medicine," and "pharmacogenomics." Id. at 6.
65 Id. at 5.
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As the FDA tells it, "The goal of personalized medicine is to
streamline clinical decision-making by distinguishing in advance those
patients most likely to benefit from a given treatment from those who
will incur cost and suffer side effects without gaining benefit." 66 This
contrasts with the current "trial-and-error" method of determining the
best treatment for an individual.67
Although much of the focus on precision medicine is devoted to
genetic diagnostic tests and genetic tests that guide treatment decisions,
precision medicine includes the use of particular treatments based on:
"patient anatomy (e.g., size), physiology (e.g., nervous and cardiovascu-
lar systems, metabolism, reproduction) and environment of use (e.g., in-
tensive care unit, home use)." 6 8  New technology also allows for
individual monitoring at home or work that impacts treatment and patient
satisfaction.6 9
Scientists, scholars, and administrators promote the shift taking
place in medical care from the "'one size fits all' approach of the past to
personalized medicine in which a new generation of molecular diagnos-
tics will be used to target treatments to an individual's unique genetic
profile,"7 0 family history, and environmental exposures.7 1  Although
physicians may see an increased likelihood of a person developing cer-
tain diseases based on his or her genetic code, or prescribe treatments
that work better for people with certain genetic sequences, they are
largely using the statistical correlation data without understanding why
these things are true. This "black box" may lead to many unintended
consequences before the science advances further.7 2 Yet physicians are
permitted the leeway to experiment and try different treatments targeted
to an individual's unique needs.
66 Id. at 6 (describing precision medicine as "providing 'the right patient with the right
drug at the right dose at the right time'" or "tailoring of medical treatment to the individual
characteristics, needs and preferences of a patient during all stages of care" (quoting Wolfgang
Saded & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized Medicine, 14 Hum. Mo-
LECULAR GENETICS R207, R207 (Oct. 15, 2005))).
67 Id.
68 PAVING THE WAY, supra note 64, at 8 (noting the use of 3D printing to customize
medical devices).
69 Id. at 9.
70 Gary E. Marchant, Foreword: Law and the New Era of Personalized Med., 48
JURIMETRICS J. 131, 131 (2008).
71 Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized Med., Sci., and the
Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'v 299, 299-300 (2015) ("Diagnosis and treat-
ment can be even more precise and scientific, and consumers of health services will be better
off.").
72 Id. at 300 ("[M]edical professionals have a sense of what works and use their judg-
ment as a guide in identifying and treating disease.").
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Precision medicine upholds the "ideal of the autonomous individ-
ual" with "more meaningful choice over health care decisions."7 3 The
focus is on the rational individual, controlling clinical care decisions.
The issue of course is how to make sure that consumers are given accu-
rate information and not misled or misdiagnosed as well as ensuring that
customized treatments are the best option for that individual. 74
Areas where precision medicine is currently in use include chemo-
therapy drugs that target tumors with particular genetic mutations, blood
thinner doses determined based on genetics, and predictions of future
illness or health conditions based on genetic information.7 5 A brief look
at two controversies that received a significant amount of attention re-
cently is illustrative of legal issues that arise.
In 2013, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office published a patent
application by Myriad, Inc., a company seeking to patent its method for
determining whether women with Ashkenazi-Jewish heritage have a
BRCA gene deficiency that dramatically increases the likelihood that
they will develop breast and/or ovarian cancer. 7 6 In Association for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. '77 the Supreme Court agreed
with the Association of Medical Pathologists's claim that the breast can-
cer gene could not be patented. According to the Court, portions of
DNA are not patentable, although synthetic DNA is patentable.78 An-
other company, Nitromed, described its patent for the pharmaceutical
BiDil as reducing deaths from heart failure or improving the quality of
life in black patients.79 Each of these companies relied on previous pat-
ents but then customized them to specific populations. The question of
whether this creates an issue for the patent system is beyond the scope of
this Article,8 0 but it illustrates how medicine is taking existing tests and
treatments and customizing them to groups of similarly situated individu-
als to improve medical care.
Rachel Sachs examines how new regulations of diagnostic testing
brought about by the movement for precision medicine are decreasing
73 Id. at 301.
74 Id. at 301-03 ("Information can be revealed, but it cannot be verified in the same way
that it can with a car or with the creditworthiness of a borrower. With medical treatment, the
patient cannot know whether the diagnosis or treatment is correct until the disease either does
not arise or there is full recovery.").
75 Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Pol'y: Preserving the Future of Personalized
Med., 49 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1881, 1883-84 (2016) (noting President Obama's January 2015
announcement of a $215 million Precision Medicine Initiative during his State of the Union
speech).
76 Ghosh, supra note 71, at 304-06.
77 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
78 Id. at 2119.
79 Ghosh, supra note 71, at 306-07.
80 See id. at 309-11.
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incentives for innovation, however. While Myriad's genetic test for
BRCA mutations has analytic validity-can accurately determine the
presence or absence of the relevant genetic mutations-it lacks clinical
validity since the extent to which particular mutations result in an in-
creased risk for breast or ovarian cancer is not provided and there may be
untested mutations that result in increased risks."1
The case of the company 23andMe, Inc., which marketed genetic
testing broadly to individuals interested in learning more about their ge-
netic code, is similar. In November 2013, a complaint was filed with the
FDA against 23andMe, followed shortly by a class action lawsuit.8 2 The
FDA found that the genetic tests did not support the company's claim
that it provided information that could be used to diagnose consumers or
make predictions about their future health outcomes. In addition,
23andMe was building a database of consumers' genetic information to
market information to other groups, creating issues related to information
privacy. The company now provides only ancestry and raw genetic
information.83
Just as the lack of data demonstrating the validity of new precision
medicine testing results in government restriction and a lack of innova-
tion, the lack of studies demonstrating that a particular social interven-
tion will improve an individual or a population's health will be an
obstacle towards funding to decrease social inequality in an effort to im-
prove health outcomes. The main difference is that precision medicine is
couched in the mystique of the medicalized model of healthcare and less
subject to scrutiny. The result is that doctors and scientists have been
given more leeway to experiment with tailoring their new brand of
medicine.
The exclusive focus on the advance of healthcare through precision
medicine is misguided if the goal is improved population health. Just as
increased healthcare spending has not resulted in improved health out-
comes in the U.S. overall, increased spending on precision medicine
alone is not sufficient because it fails to address the social determinants
of health. As public health scholars have pleaded, "[W]e worry that an
unstinting focus on precision medicine by trusted spokespeople for
81 Sachs, supra note 75, at 1891-94 (noting that regulation by Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988,
or CLIA, helps ensure analytical validity).
82 Ghosh, supra note 71, at 320-21.
83 Id. at 321 ("As with the other examples of personalized medicine related companies,
the story of 23andMe demonstrates the differences in information between companies and
consumers and the controversies over the underlying science supporting the services being
advertised and provided."). When combined with decreased reimbursement rates under Medi-
care for diagnostic tests and cases restricting the ability of companies to patent personalized
diagnostic tests, the effect of these additional regulations is to hinder innovation in this area of
precision medicine. Sachs, supra note 75, at 1923.
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health is a mistake-and a distraction from the goal of producing a
healthier population." 4
Genetic links have less impact on health outcomes than "behavioral
and social factors."8 5 In fact, research shows that even when individuals
are aware of risk factors for disease that suggest they should modify their
behavior in some way, they fail to make those behavioral changes. 86
Only by addressing "the foundational causes of ill health such as poverty,
obesity, and education," can substantial health gains be made.87 There is
ample evidence that improving clinical care, while helpful at the individ-
ual level, cannot improve the disparity in health outcomes among differ-
ent subpopulationsI' Spending on preventive public health programs
typically improves health more than clinical treatment of illness and inju-
ries.89 Genetic risk factors are responsible far less for diseases like
asthma, diabetes, cancer, and cardiovascular disease than "environmental
and behavioral factors." 90 Yet funding for research related to population
health or public health has declined over the last decade while genetic
research funding has increased dramatically. 9 1
There are ways to apply precision medicine for the benefit of the
population, however. Dividing populations into risk groups and adjust-
ing medical strategies to each group can help and might reduce the cost
of care by focusing on those with the greatest need.9 2 Research must
focus on both genetic and social determinants of health. "For example,
84 Ronald Bayer & Sandro Galea, Public Health in the Precision-Med. Era, 373 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 499, 501 (2015).
85 Mum J. Khoury & Sandro Galea, Will Precision Medicine Improve Population
Health?, 316 JAMA 1357, 1357 (2016) ("The solution to these challenges is probably not an
increased focus on the individual, but rather involves focusing on the social, economic, and
structural drivers of population health that are ubiquitous and inevitably linked to health
achievement as a country.").
86 Id.
87 Id.; Bayer & Galea, supra note 84, at 501 ("Unfortunately, all the evidence suggests
that we, as a country, are far from recognizing that our collective health is shaped by factors
well beyond clinical care or our genes.").
88 Bayer & Galea, supra note 84, at 500 (citing British studies showing that even a
strong national, single payer system does not alleviate the differential in health outcomes be-
tween those with different income levels); Chris Carlsten et al., Genes, the Env't and Person-
alized Med., 15 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 736, 736 (2014) ("[P]ersonalized
medicine could theoretically reduce healthcare costs, as an individual's genetic or other bio-
logical information could be used to make better or earlier diagnoses of disease, apply cheaper,
preventive measures to decrease risk, and make more efficient use of therapeutic opinions.
However, there remains a considerable gap between theory and reality, and we think that the
prevailing focus on an individual's genes and biology insufficiently incorporates the important
role of environmental factors in disease etiology and health.").
89 Carlsten et al., supra note 88, at 736.
90 Id. at 737 ("[T]he 'elephant in the room' of personalized medicine is the fact that
genetic effects in isolation are insufficient to identify the risk in the most prevalent diseases.").
91 Khoury & Galea, supra note 85, at 1357.
92 Id. at 1357-58.
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biological knowledge of genetic susceptibility to environmental and oc-
cupational exposures could lead to population-wide policy protection
based on thresholds determined by the most susceptible individuals in the
population rather than individual genetic testing with exposure avoidance
only in susceptible individuals."'9 3 Focusing on health concerns at the
individual level, on the other hand, has the "potential for widening the
divide between the haves and have-nots." 9 4
II. HEALTH SAVINGs ACCOUNTS
The best way to reduce social inequality is through a basic income
that allows families to meet essential needs and therefore improves
health outcomes. Given the current political climate, however, a basic
income is unlikely to be implemented in the U.S. for the next several
years (at a minimum). With the Republican focus on HSAs, they are
instead a realistic avenue for reform.
Jacob Hacker asserted in 2008 that HSAs are a "near-theological
aspiration of the Right" but are "poised to make the increasingly risky
world of private health insurance even more fragmented and frighten-
ing."9 5 His concern was that only the healthy and those who could afford
to bear a significant level of medical expenses before high-deductible
insurance kicks in would voluntarily enroll in HSAs. The accounts
would therefore skim the cheapest workers to cover from traditional
health insurance plans and leave behind less healthy workers. This
would cause premiums to increase in traditional plans, the healthiest of
those remaining to leave for HSAs, and the process to continue in the
"death spiral of adverse selection." 9 6
Yet today, many employees have HDHPs, and the ones who have
HSAs at all are lucky. HSAs and the HDHPs that they are paired with
are a large and growing portion of the health insurance landscape.
Among firms that offer health benefits, twenty-four percent offered an
HSA-qualified HDHP in 2016.97 Large firms are more likely to offer an
HDHP with a savings account than smaller firms.9 8 Twenty-nine percent
93 Id. at 1358.
94 Id.
95 HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 13, at 153-54.
96 Id. ("The Right once embraced private insurance precisely because it pooled risk with-
out government intrusion; but as private insurance has grown less capable of pooling risk
across America's working population-both because of the sharp decline in its reach and be-
cause of the dramatic change in employer and insurance practices-conservatives have not
tried to save what they once championed.").
97 Kaiser Family Found.: THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH &
EDUCATIONAL TRUST, Employer Health Benefits 2016 Annual Survey 154, 158 ex. 8.1 (Sep.
14, 2016), http://tiles.kff.orglattachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-Annual-Sur-
vey (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
98 Id. at 154, 158-59 exs. 8.2-8.3.
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of all employees covered by employment-based health insurance are en-
rolled in an HDHP with a savings account (HRA or HSA); nineteen per-
cent are enrolled in an HDHP with an HSA. 9 9 Employees have slowly
gotten used to this method of health financing-and to paying more for
their health expenses.
Employees enrolled in HDHPs pay more for their healthcare than
employees enrolled in traditional health insurance plans. The average
annual deductible for HDHPs/HSAs is $2,295 for single coverage and
$4,364 for family coverage-with a wide variation among plans.'0 The
average annual out-of-pocket maximum for single coverage is $4,083.10
Employees receive an average annual employer contribution to their
HSA of $686 for single coverage and $1,208 for family coverage, but
this obscures the fact that twenty-five percent of employees enrolled in
an HDHP/HSA option do not receive any employer contributions in their
accounts.1 02 After factoring in employer contributions, the average an-
nual deductible for those with single coverage is $1,701 at small firms
and $1,326 at large firms. 0 3
Many employees cannot afford to pay these deductibles and must
therefore sacrifice medical care to pay for other essential items like hous-
ing and childcare. Yet this appears to be the direction that Republicans
will take health reform if given the chance. Perhaps they will be ex-
panded to cover more Americans with contributions to the accounts com-
ing from the government instead of only from employers and employees.
Regardless, they can only be spent on items defined in § 213(d). Here, I
discuss the rise of individual accounts in health financing and specifi-
cally the laws and regulations relevant to HSAs. I argue that HSAs can
be tailored to help reduce social inequalities in health.
A. History and Regulation of Health Savings Accounts
HSAs were established effective January 1, 2004. A few weeks
later, President George W. Bush stated that "[t]hey will help restrain the
health care costs that are affecting us all."' 0 4 He used the word "em-
99 Id. at 154, 160-61 exs. 8.4-8.6.
10 Id. at 154-55, 161-62 exs. 8.7-8.8.
101 THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST,. at
155, 161-62 exs. 8.7-8.8.
102 Id. at 156-57, 161-62 exs. 8.7-8.8.
103 Id. at 164 exs. 8.12.
104 Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Quality, Affordable
Health Care (Jan. 28, 2004), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2004/01/20040128-2.html ("When consumers don't have the incentive to get better prices,
costs go up.").
2017] 85
86 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
power" repeatedly. 0 5 Individuals would be empowered by saving for
and paying their own routine medical expenses while maintaining insur-
ance coverage for catastrophic health events. President Bush also said
that the "incentive" for individuals to better take care of their health
would prevent illness.
Among President Bush's claims was that employers and individuals
would save on the cost of health insurance premiums through the use of
HDHPs. The accounts would help cover the uninsured by allowing indi-
viduals to deduct premiums for HDHPs regardless of whether they
itemize. 106
The overall message from President Bush and other supporters of
HSAs, though, was that these are accounts that "the employee controls"
and "families can keep their savings in an account that belongs to them,
not to their employer or to an insurance company." 0 7  Representative
Michael C. Burgess added, "The most important thing, though, Mr.
Speaker, is this is money that patients own and they control. It is their
accounts, not the government's." 0 8
A health savings account is a "trust created . . . exclusively for the
purpose of paying the qualified medical expenses of the account benefi-
ciary."' 9 Both the employer and employee may contribute to the
HSA. 0 For 2017, the limit on contributions to an HSA is $3,400 for an
account holder with individual insurance coverage and $6,750 for an ac-
105 Id. ("The best way to empower citizens is to let them save and spend their health care
dollars as they see fit. In other words, start to empower people to make the right decisions
with their health care dollars.").
106 Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Expanding Access and Increasing
the Affordability of Health Insurance Through Health Savings Accounts (Aug. 9, 2004), https:/
/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-14.html.
107 Id.
108 150 CONG. REc. H3405-06, H3406 (daily ed. May 20, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Burgesss).
109 26 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1). Where employer involvement is limited, HSAs are not subject
to ERISA. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. No.
2004-01, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS (2004) [hereinafter FIELD BULL. HSAs], https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsalemployers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2004-
01#Footnotes (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (HSAs do not typically meet the definition of "em-
ployee welfare benefit plans" under Title I of ERISA even if an employer contributes to the
accounts because participation by employees is voluntary and "the beneficiaries of the account
have sole control and are exclusively responsible for expending the funds in compliance with
the requirements of the Code."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMF. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. No. 2006-02, HEALTH SAVINGS AccOUNTS-ERISA Q&As (2006),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulle-
tins/2006-02 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017); IRS Notice 2004-2, 2004-1 C.B. 269, Q&A-29 (HSA
trustees or custodians need not determine that account holders are spending the funds properly,
and the account holders must maintain paperwork to prove that the funds are used for qualified
medical expenses.). The shift of responsibility to individuals with HSAs and the movement
away from ERISA protection is troubling.
110 IRS Notice 2004-2, supra note 109, at Q&A-l 1.
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count holder with family coverage."II Those age 55 or older can contrib-
ute an additional $1,000 per year.11 2  Employers making their own
contributions to employee HSAs must contribute similarly for all eligible
employees during the same time period." 3
Only individuals who are participants in an HDHPi1 4 are eligible to
deduct amounts contributed to an HSA from their income." 5 For 2017,
an HDHP is defined as a plan "with an annual deductible that is not less
than $1,300 for self-only coverage or $2,600 for family coverage, and the
annual out-of-pocket expenses (deductibles, co-payments, and other
amounts, but not premiums) do not exceed $6,550 for self-only coverage
or $13,100 for family coverage."' 16 Account holders may not have other
health insurance coverage in addition to the HDHP" 7 with a few excep-
tions."1 8 An exception permits insurance plans that do not charge a de-
ductible for preventive care only to be treated as HDHPs," 9 although it
is not required that HDHPs offer coverage for preventive care.1 2 0
1ll Rev. Proc. 2016-28, 2016-20 I.R.B. 852.
112 26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(3).
113 FIELD BULL. HSAs, supra note 112.
114 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2) ("The term 'high deductible health plan' means a health plan-
(i) which has an annual deductible which is not less than-(I) $1,000 for self-only coverage,
and (II) twice the dollar amount in subclause (I) for family coverage, and (ii) the sum of the
annual deductible and the other annual out-of-pocket expenses required to be paid under the
plan (other than for premiums) for covered benefits does not exceed-(I) $5,000 for self-only
coverage, and (II) twice the dollar amount in subclause (I) for family coverage.").
115 Id. § 223(a) ("In the case of an individual who is an eligible individual for any month
during the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount
equal to the aggregate amount paid in cash during such taxable year by or on behalf of such
individual to a health savings account of such individual."); id. § 223(c)(1)(A) ("The term
'eligible individual' means, with respect to any month, any individual if-(i) such individual is
covered under a high deductible health plan as of the Ist day of such month . . . .").
116 Rev. Proc. 2016-28, 2016-20 I.R.B. 852. But see IRS Notice 2004-50, 2004-2 C.B.
196, Q&A-16 ("Restricting benefits to UCR [usual, customary and reasonable amounts] is a
reasonable restriction on benefits. Thus, amounts paid by covered individuals in excess of
UCR that are not paid by an HDHP are not included in determining maximum out-of-pocket
expenses.").
'17 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1)(A) ("The term 'eligible individual' means, with respect to any
month, any individual if- . . . (ii) such individual is not, while covered under a high deducti-
ble health plan, covered under any health plan-(I) which is not a high deductible health plan,
and (II) which provides coverage for any benefit which is covered under the high deductible
health plan.").
118 See id. § 223(c)(1)(B), (c)(3). But see Rev. Rul. 2004-38, 2004-1 C.B. 717 ("This
ruling provides that if an individual is covered by both a high deductible health plan (HDHP)
that does not cover prescription drugs and by a separate drug plan (or rider) that provides
benefits before the minimum annual deductible of the HDHP has been satisfied, that individual
is not an eligible individual under [§1 223(c)(1)(A) of the Code and may not make contribu-
tions to a Health Savings Account.").
' 19 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(C) ("Safe harbor for absence of preventive care deductible.-A
plan shall not fail to be treated as a high deductible health plan by reason of failing to have a
deductible for preventive care (within the meaning of section 1871 of the Social Security Act,
except as otherwise provided by the Secretary).").
120 IRS Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725.
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The IRS has provided a significant amount of guidance on what fits
within the preventive care exception to the requirement that HSA ac-
count holders use them with only HDHPs. Preventive care includes, but
is not limited to:
"Periodic health evaluations, including tests and diag-
nostic procedures ordered in connection with routine ex-
aminations, such as annual physicals.
* Routine prenatal and well-child care.
* Child and adult immunizations.
* Tobacco cessation programs.
* Obesity weight-loss programs.
* Screening services ....
Screening services include everything from routine newborn care to spe-
cific cancer and heart disease screenings.1 22
Preventive care includes medications taken to control the risk for a
disease "that has not yet manifested itself or not yet become clinically
apparent (i.e., asymptomatic), or to prevent reoccurrence of a disease."1 2 3
The safe harbor also covers "any treatment that is incidental or ancillary
to a preventing care service or screening" such as the removal of polyps
during a colonoscopy because it is "unreasonable or impractical" to re-
peat the procedure to treat the ancillary condition.1 24
Section 1001 of the ACA added section 2713 to the Public Health
Service Act, which requires those offering group and individual health
insurance to provide certain preventive healthcare without cost-sharing
requirements such as deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance.1 25
Therefore, a health plan will not fail to qualify as an HDHP simply be-
cause it offers these preventive care services without a deductible.1 26
Outside of preventive care, the individual must pay for medical ex-
penses under the HDHP deductible threshold using HSA funds (or
outside funds if the HSA account balance is insufficient). HSA funds
may only be used for "qualified medical expenses," which are "amounts
paid by such beneficiary for medical care (as defined in [§] 213(d)[)]" for
121 Id.
122 Id. at app.
123 IRS Notice 2004-50, 2004-2 C.B. 196, Q&A-27 (providing the examples of choles-
terol lowering drugs such as Statins and weight-loss programs while noting that the safe harbor
"does not include any service or benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury, or
condition").
124 Id. at Q&A-26.
125 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13; see IRS Notice 2013-57, 2013-40 I.R.B. 293 (noting that the
ACA also incorporated section 2713 into ERISA and the Code).
126 IRS Notice 2013-57, 2013-40 I.R.B. 293.
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the account holder and her family "but only to the extent such amounts
are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."1 27
Payments from the account for qualified medical expenses are ex-
cluded from the account holder's income. 128 Any medical expenses de-
fined by § 213(d) that are paid for from the HSA may not also be
deducted to the extent they constitute ten percent or more of income.1 29
Payments not used for qualified medical expenses are subject to a twenty
percent penalty tax,1 3 0 although there are exceptions for payments made
after the account holder becomes eligible for Medicare or is disabled and
after the holder's death. 1 3 ' Unlike with FSAs, the account holder does
not forfeit unused balances in the account. 13 2
Today, there is evidence that HSA account holders with lower in-
comes engage in fewer non-preventive outpatient office visits, particu-
larly specialist visits, than low income workers enrolled in a preferred
provider organization (PPO) plan.1 3 3 Although there is a decline in such
visits for higher income employees as well, it is twice as large for the
low income group. 1 3 4 Low income employees enrolled in an HSA also
reduce their use of preventive services, such as flu vaccinations, more
than higher income employees.1 3 5  Finally, low income HSA account
holders have higher rates of emergency room (ER) visits and hospital
admissions compared to those in the PPO plan.1 3 6 The effect appears
however, to be only a short-term increase in hospital visits. Inexperi-
enced HSA users may shift towards preventive and outpatient care once
127 26 U.S.C. § 223(d)(2)(A).
128 Id. § 223(f)(1).
129 Id. § 223(f)(6) ("For purposes of determining the amount of the deduction under [§]
213, any payment or distribution out of a health savings account for qualified medical ex-
penses shall not be treated as an expense paid for medical care.").
130 Id. § 223(f)(4)(A) ("The tax imposed by this chapter on the account beneficiary for
any taxable year in which there is a payment or distribution from a health savings account of
such beneficiary which is includible in gross income under paragraph (2) shall be increased by
20 percent of the amount which is so includible.").
131 26 U.S.C. § 223(f)(4)(B) ("Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the payment or distri-
bution is made after the account beneficiary becomes disabled within the meaning of [§]
72(m)(7) or dies. "); id. § 223(f)(4)(C) ("Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any payment or
distribution after the date on which the account beneficiary attains the age specified in section
1811 of the Social Security Act.").
132 Id. § 223(d)(1)(E) ("The interest of an individual in the balance in his account is
nonforfeitable.").
133 Paul Fronstin & M. Christopher Roebuck, The Impact of an HSA-Eligible Health Plan
on Health Care Services Use and Spending by Worker Income, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Issue
Brief No. 425, at 1, 12-14 (Aug. 2016).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1, 14, 17 ("Perhaps the biggest surprise among the findings is that emergency
department visits and inpatient hospital admissions increased among lower-income individuals
who enrolled in the HSA-eligible health plan.").
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they see the costs associated with hospital visits,1 3 7 which emphasizes
the need for education of individuals on how to minimize expenses when
using an HSA and HDHP.
B. Political Feasibility of Expanding Medical Care
The definition of "medical care" covered by health insurance and
individual accounts has already been expanded over the years to include
the pre-payment of regular, predictable expenses associated with preven-
tive care. Americans have become used to health insurance that covers
catastrophic medical expenses that would otherwise result in great finan-
cial harm to the individual in addition to the pre-payment of regular med-
ical care. It is this latter category that seems most akin to the funding of
basic social needs that result in poor health outcomes.
Many Republican proposals to replace the ACA would increase the
cost of medical care by allowing healthy individuals to opt out of the
insurance market. Any increases to direct government expenditures will
be politically unpalatable, though. Christopher Howard has, however,
brought scholarly attention to the American use of indirect spending, tax
expenditures in particular, to finance a welfare state that is much bigger
than is commonly perceived.13 8 "The hidden welfare state is roughly
one-third to one-half the size of the visible welfare state of direct
spending."' 3 9
Tax expenditures are tax deductions, credits, deferrals, exclusions,
or reduced tax rates targeted to "a particular industry, activity, or class of
persons." 4 0 Foregone tax revenues are the equivalent of direct spending
appropriations.141 In healthcare, for example, the largest federal tax ex-
penditure is the exclusion for private employer-sponsored health insur-
ance.1 4 2 "Most housing programs are administered through the tax code
rather than appropriations; the U.S. government spends twice as much on
housing tax expenditures as on traditional housing programs."l 4 3 Middle
and upper class Americans are typically the beneficiaries of tax expendi-
tures,1 4 4 although as my proposal below shows, that need not be the case.
137 Id.
138 Christopher Howard, The Hidden Side of the Am. Welfare State, 108 POL. Sci. Q. 403
(1993).
I39 Id. at 405.
140 Id. at 407.
'41 Id.
142 SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44333, HEALTH-
RELATED TAx EXPENDITURES: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS AT SUMMARY AND 7 (Jan. 8, 2016).
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misclR44333.pdf.
143 Howard, supra note 138, at 416.
144 Id. at 416-17.
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Howard's research challenges the idea of a two-track social welfare
system because the benefits employees receive through tax expenditures
are not truly earned. "[Mlost tax expenditures are structured as open-
ended entitlements; their receipt does not depend on the judgment of
caseworkers and does not entail social stigma. . . . [B]enefits are tied
more to income than employment. Recipients do not have to earn their
tax benefits." 4 5
Tax expenditures have been enacted regularly, even during times
known for resistance to new social welfare programs. Unlike direct so-
cial spending, which largely came in a few "big bangs" such as the New
Deal and the Great Society, important tax expenditures have at times
done what "the government could not or would not do directly." 4 6 Tax
expenditures have also been passed during Republican control of the
White House and Congress.1 4 7 In fact, "the actors who keep surfacing as
the builders of the hidden welfare state are moderate and conservative
members of Congress." 4 8
Although the debate over tax expenditures has become more public
over time, conflict over these provisions still pales in comparison to ma-
jor direct spending bills in social welfare. As Howard says of past enact-
ments, "Hardly anyone at the time trumpeted their passage or predicted
that dire consequences would result. Hardly anyone noticed at all." 1 4 9
Another reason that tax expenditures are easier to pass in political
climates hostile to new social welfare spending is "ambiguity of pur-
pose."' 50 Tax expenditures can be touted as "social welfare programs"
or as "tax relief'-or both.' 5 ' Although Congress has become less re-
ceptive to new tax expenditures,1 5 2 I imagine that the extreme rhetoric
against the ACA will make healthcare reform feasible only through indi-
rect tax expenditures enacted as part of the repeal of key provisions of
the ACA.
145 Id. at 418.
146 Id. at 421-22.
147 Id. at 423 ("Tax expenditures for corporate pensions and corporate health benefits, two
of the three largest programs currently, were enacted under unified Republican control for the
White House and Congress. The Work Incentive (WIN) tax credit and Earned Income Tax
Credit were enacted when Republicans controlled the White House and Democrats controlled
Congress.").
148 Id. at 425.
149 Id. at 426-31 (explaining also the credit claiming opportunities for members of the
revenue committees in Congress passing tax expenditures).
150 Id. at 431.
151 Id. (noting that this allows for broader political coalitions to be built around the
proposals).
152 Id. at 433 (explaining how Congress attaches a tax expenditure budget to its annual
budget and how congressmen supporting new expenditures need to detail how they will pay
for the programs).
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Although conservatives frequently discuss limiting the high costs of
entitlement programs, the use of tax expenditures as an alternate strategy
does not decrease costs. While entitlement programs that must provide
benefits to all who meet the eligibility criteria are criticized because
costs-which are clear and measureable-can increase far beyond fore-
casts, the same is not true of tax subsidized private social welfare pro-
grams.1 53 As Jacob Hacker says about tax-funded, private programs:
Tax subsidies for private benefits are actually identical
to entitlement programs in structure. Once the tax treat-
ment of a benefit is decided upon, qualification is auto-
matic, and no additional legislative action or budgetary
appropriation is required, regardless of eventual costs.
Unlike most entitlements, however, the effects of priva-
tized approaches emerge from the interplay of public
policies and a multitude of private decisions by individu-
als and organizations, making their ultimate outcomes
even more unpredictable and unstable.1 54
Thus, the main advantage of indirect tax expenditures instead of direct
government funding for broad-based social welfare programs is political
cover. They have provided the government with a tool to enact programs
to fill unmet needs-even where the public does not recognize the need.
They have enabled the millions who receive welfare benefits through tax
expenditures to feel positive about their benefits, although they have also
set up the view of other groups who do not receive such benefits as
unworthy of them.
C. A Proposal for Precision Healthcare Accounts
I argue here that the time has come to experiment with personal-
izing health financing through individualized tax expenditures that rely
on a taxpayer's genetic code, personal characteristics, and environment
to determine what can appropriately be considered "medical care" under
§ 213 of the Code. Too much focus in precision medicine is on genetics
and too little on the social determinants of health. Targeted spending on
housing and education, for example, can improve health outcomes more
than genetic testing ever will. Precision healthcare accounts can help.
Assuming that healthcare reform will proceed through individual
accounts tied to the definition of medical care under § 213, I propose
that: (1) the government provide subsidies for low-income taxpayers in
153 JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUB. AND PRI-
VATE Soc. BENEFITS IN THE U.S. 48 (2002) [hereinafter HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE
STATE] ("Yet compared with many privatized social policy approaches, public entitlement pro-
grams seem exceedingly well mannered and responsive.").
154 Id.
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the form of contributions to the HSA, and (2) the definition of "medical
care" under § 213 be interpreted to apply to expenses such as food, hous-
ing, and educational costs that could prevent diseases like asthma, diabe-
tes, obesity, and cardiovascular disease among those with low incomes. I
do not believe this requires a statutory amendment but instead only a
change in the interpretation of current law-a recognition that the social
determinants of health play a far bigger role in the "treatment" and "pre-
vention of disease" than clinical care and certainly affect the "structure
or function of the body."
Those with lower incomes need more spending on food, housing,
and education to prevent poor health than on genomics. If the IRS is
concerned with ensuring that those who install elevators in their houses
for health reasons are fully compensated, then why not pay for a low-
income person with the same health issues to move from an apartment in
a non-elevator building to a building with an elevator? Why prohibit the
deduction of the air conditioner simply because it benefits the health of
the rest of the family?
Personalized default rules are instructive here. Courts or adminis-
trative agencies could apply different default tax rules for individuals in
different income brackets. Those with higher incomes could deduct as
"medical care" or spend HSA funds on experimental genetic testing and
targeted immunotherapy cancer treatments but not on ordinary food,
housing, and educational expenses that the person is likely to and can
afford to pay for regardless of whether they are tax-subsidized. Those
with lower incomes, whose health is affected by these ordinary expendi-
tures that they cannot afford to make, could deduct or use HSA funds for
healthcare that is both ordinary and essential. While they can engage in
the same use of precision medicine as those in higher income brackets,
they are likely to use the funds to meet more basic needs.
Although a doctor's prescription for mold remediation, pest control,
or a personal trainer might not be definitive to show that this is allowable
medical care under the Code, it would be one factor in showing that these
services are necessary to prevent or treat illness or disease. Given the
emphasis on individual control over the funds in HSAs and rational deci-
sion making in healthcare use, the decision of what to spend this limited
source of funds on should be between the individual and her doctor-
with the IRS simply issuing guidelines on allowable medical care that are
different for people with different income levels.
Farther into the future, I believe it will be possible to customize tax
deductions based on an individual's genetic code and risks. The use of
big data in commerce will someday be mirrored in healthcare. Yet there
is a need to fix the mismatch between improved genetic diagnosis of
health risks and medical care that deals appropriately with those newly
2017] 93
94 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
discovered risks. The solution is not always more clinical spending.
This is why the U.S. spends nearly eighteen percent of its GDP on
healthcare but produces population health inferior to its peer countries.
Instead, a database will hopefully someday show the most efficient
social spending to prevent asthma in young children at high risk for the
disease, even if it means subsidizing a move to a different location under
§ 213. Research in precision medicine at the individual level can be
brought to bear on problems "beyond the individual for population- or
community-level interventions."' 55 Individuals can be sent a list of items
that will be tax-subsidized this year based on their characteristics and
genetic risk factors. That list could change every year or remain stable
for a designated time period to allow for long-term planning.
The increasing use of big data in medicine-and in commerce-has
made personalization possible. While data mining raises ethical ques-
tions, it presents opportunities and will likely reshape our legal system in
the coming decades.
Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahievitz make the argument that "law
should become more personalized."' 5 6 An example they give is having
different default rules in intestacy for men and women since men are
more likely to leave all their property or a larger share of their property
to their spouse in a will. Porat and Strahievitz give the reason that wo-
men are less trusting that their husbands will not later remarry and divert
money from the couple's children.' 5 7 They also advance an argument
for allowing courts to "determine how an intestate's estate should be al-
located based on an analysis of his consumer behavior during his life-
time."15  With big data, courts can investigate the choices of "guinea
pigs" with similar behavior and characteristics to use as a "template" for
identifying choices that the intestate would have made in a will.1 59
155 Carlsten et al., supra note 88, at 737 (providing the example of a group of students
with a higher genetic risk for asthma and parents who lobby the city to build a school outside a
high traffic area as a result, benefiting the whole community and not just those at high risk).
156 Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2014) (arguing for personalized default rules
and disclosures instead of a tradition where the "state generally does not tailor the contents of
the law to people's characteristics and traits").
157 Id. at 1419.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1419-20 (noting that this would better fit the desires of the majority of individu-
als who do not draft wills and might result in increased efficiency if others determine that they
no longer need to pay for the drafting of wills with more tailored default rules); see Ian Ayres,
Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 1
(1993); George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1109 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. I
(2013).
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Contract law is also thought of as an area where default rules can
save parties money by implicit incorporation into contracts.1 60 Yet if the
default rules are not sufficiently personalized to the parties' preferences,
then default rules can increase transaction costs by forcing parties to opt
out or preventing an agreement where opting out is too costly.' 6 1
Porat and Strahilevitz address how to implement a legal system with
different default rules for different people. Because of institutional com-
petence concerns, they focus less on the option for courts to ex post fill
in the default terms where a contract or will is silent using the character-
istics of the parties at the time they entered into the contract or will.
Instead, they suggest that: (1) companies provide their customers with
personalized default contracts, which customers can view before execu-
tion, or (2) government agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau develop default contracts tailored to types of customers and re-
quire companies to offer the terms to customers fitting the profile, which
customers can view before execution.1 62 The first solution strikes me as
unlikely to succeed because companies lack the incentive to carefully
research what default provisions make sense for particular consumers.
But the second permits a government agency to develop more granular
default rules based on the data available, and this is a solution that could
apply in the context of medical care deductions and the social determi-
nants of health.
Among the examples used by Porat and Strahilevitz of areas where
personalized default rules might be helpful are organ donation and medi-
cal malpractice. In organ donation, the U.S. faces constant shortages be-
cause we have an opt in system instead of an opt out system as some
other countries use.' 6 3 They recommend personalizing a default rule that
varies depending on a predictive model of organ donation preferences.1 6 4
In the area of medical malpractice, the personalized default framework
allows for more accuracy in establishing what a reasonable physician or
patient would do in a given set of circumstances.1 6 5
These two examples are informative. If the U.S. can incentivize
individual spending in areas that are key to population health and do so
by utilizing data on what a reasonable HSA account holder with similar
160 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 156, at 1422-23.
161 Id. at 1423 ("Default rules governing specific types of transactions should be tailored
until finer tailoring is not cost justified, i.e., when additional tailoring will increase transaction
costs.").
162 Id. at 1440-41.
163 Id. at 1442.
164 Id. at 1442-44.
165 Id. at 1444-46 (explaining that figuring out what a reasonable physician or patient
would have done at the time of the medical decision or action in question is easier under this
model because it moves away from "hindsight bias").
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characteristics would do in a similar situation, then it can target its
spending-through tax subsidies-to the areas that are needed to im-
prove overall health. This targeted spending would hopefully reduce the
blunt instrument of overall healthcare spending as preventive care re-
sulted in cost savings.
Drawbacks to this personalized deduction framework include cross
subsidization-two healthcare consumers buy the same good or service
for the same price but different tax rules govern the transaction, strategic
behavior-behaving differently to receive a different default rule from
the database, inappropriate data use by the government, and uncertainty
about consumer behavior that decreases the effectiveness of the law or
increases adjudication costs.1 6 6 Concerns also include creating negative
stereotypes about a group based on data16 7 and information privacy is-
sues and laws that may prevent efficient mining of big data for the pur-
pose of tailoring default tax rules.16 8
Yet the very idea of precision medicine mandates that different indi-
viduals receive different medical care. The next step is to realize that
this care need not be clinical. Individualized medicine should give way
to individualized tax rules related to healthcare. This framework is ap-
propriate not only because much of our welfare state is financed through
tax expenditures, but also because even a single payer system does not
remediate the social determinants of health. Personalized tax expendi-
tures could therefore be combined with other methods of healthcare
financing.
III. BRIDGING DICHOTOMIES
My proposal to personalize tax expenditures requires reconciling
two dichotomies that pervade health policy discussions: (1) entitlements
v. grants-in-aid and (2) pooled insurance v. consumer-driven health plans
(CDHPs, also called consumer-directed health plans). Health financing
for the poor in this country has fluctuated between an entitlement
model-in which all who meet the eligibility criteria have a right to
health insurance-and grants-in-aid-where a specific amount of money
is designated to states to provide money to its needy population regard-
less of the number or demographics of those who fall below a specific
income level.
While precision healthcare accounts could be funded either as a
traditional entitlement program where all participants are entitled to cer-
tain balances in their accounts depending on their income level or as a
166 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 156 at 1453-59.
167 Id. at 1461-63.
168 Id. at 1467-69.
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grant-in-aid where states are given a set amount of money to put in ac-
counts for their populations, if Medicare moves to an individual account
form, the likelihood of entitlement funding for these accounts increases
because of its broad base of support.
Similarly, putting more power in the hands of individuals to decide
how their healthcare funds are spent calls into question the tradition of
pooled insurance in favor of the recent push towards CDHPs. It is diffi-
cult for insurance companies to calculate risk if they do not know pre-
cisely what expenses they will incur for different populations. Increasing
expenses for those already at the highest risk for costly medical problems
(those with lower incomes) makes them undesirable as insurance cus-
tomers. Yet if science can show direct cost savings that result from using
healthcare funding to address the social determinants of health, then in-
surance companies may be more willing to move into this unchartered
territory. Individual choice over how to spend money allocated for social
and medical causes may even be unnecessary if parties are required to
choose among items with demonstrated efficacy that improve health out-
comes and decrease costs.
In the end, I argue that an entitlement method of funding precision
HSAs along with pooled insurance subsidized by the government for
those able to spend funds on social causes of poor health is the most
realistic resolution of these dichotomies. Only a broad-based entitlement
to funding for all healthcare expenses (medical and social) allows for
significant improvements in overall population health. Since allowing
individuals to spend their account balances on items such as housing and
food will increase overall expenses and result in insurance companies
paying more of their medical expenses, the government must subsidize
traditional insurance costs for individuals who receive this type of fund-
ing for social expenses or demonstrate that the additional expenses result
in equivalent long-term savings from improved health outcomes.
A. Entitlements v. Grants-in-Aid
After the passage of the ACA, states such as Indiana received waiv-
ers to implement a unique version of the Medicaid expansion. In Indi-
ana, when Vice-President Mike Pence was Governor, that included
payments made by those enrolled in Medicaid into individual accounts
that are used for insurance premiums (not co-pays, which must be paid
for separately).1 6 9 This means that participants were required to pay for
169 Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Healthy Indiana Plan, IN.GOV,
http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2017); see Alana Semuels, Indiana's
Medicaid Experiment May Reveal Obamacare's Future, THE ATLANTIC, (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/medicaid-and-mike-pence/511262/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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a portion of their Medicaid health insurance premiums, and the govern-
ment paid the remainder. While a brief history of the hostility towards
entitlement programs will demonstrate why those on Medicaid typically
receive an unfavorable reception, Indiana's plan (and Kentucky's desire
to follow itl7o) illustrates some of the benefits and drawbacks of using
individual accounts to finance healthcare.
Although the American welfare state has been considered anemic in
comparison to those of western Europe, that impression changes when
private programs, subsidized by foregone tax revenue, are included.
Public social welfare programs have come in big waves, during the New
Deal in the 1930s, the Great Society in the 1960s, and more recently with
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. As a backlash developed against
public benefits that were not "earned" like those associated with employ-
ment such as Society Security and private healthcare, the advance of the
welfare state continued through supposedly private programs that are still
funded by government tax expenditures.' 7 ' "The politics of private so-
cial benefits . . . is 'subterranean' politics-far less visible to the broad
public, far more favorable to the privileged, far less constrained by the
features of American politics that routinely stymie major social reforms,
and far more dominated by conservative political actors than the making
of public social programs."1 7 2 A significant amount of policymaking
takes place under the cover of private social welfare benefits.
Although lawyers frequently speak of an entitlement as a "legally
enforceable right," this in fact says little about how a person will recog-
nize an entitlement-public or private-when she sees it.173 In laying
out the steps for an argument that there is a "constitutional right to mini-
mum entitlements," Erwin Chemerinsky included among those entitle-
ments the right to food, shelter, and medical care.1 7 4
170 See Kentucky's Medicaid Expansion Under ACA Could Soon Change, PBS NEW-
SHOUR, Jan. 7, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/kentuckys-medicaid-expansion-aca-
soon-change/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
171 STARR, supra note 15, at 129-30 ("To most Americans, 'welfare' meant aid to the idle
poor, particularly the program of cash assistance to single-parent families. . . . But the many
who disapproved of 'welfare' in the narrow sense did not necessarily think of Medicare or
even Medicaid as belonging in the same category.").
172 HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE, supra note 153, at xiii.
173 David A. Super, The Pol. Econ. of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 640-58
(2004) (providing a "taxonomy of entitlements" that includes: (1) subjective entitlement, (2)
unconditional entitlement, (3) positive entitlement, (4) budgetary entitlement, (5) responsive
entitlement, and (6) functional entitlement, and arguing in favor of clear eligibility criteria and
purpose of the funds provided instead of arbitrary caps on benefits provided or limitations of
beneficiaries).
174 Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Right Case for a Const. Right to Minimum Entitle-
ments, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525, 536-39 (1993) (advancing the possibility of using the privi-
leges or immunities clause, the due process clause, or international norms to locate this
constitutional right to minimum entitlements).
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In 1993, President Bill Clinton tried to frame healthcare as an
"earned entitlement", saying that he wanted to "giv[e] every American
health security-health care that's always there, health care that can
never be taken away."17 5  Yet Americans showed themselves to be
"deeply ambivalent about bestowing 'entitlement' status to health care"
in spite of acknowledging the need for additional government involve-
ment in healthcare.' 7 6 This ambivalence was carried over to the imple-
mentation of the ACA by the Obama administration.
Part of the problem is that Americans-including those who sit on
the Supreme Court-have made different judgments about what social
welfare benefits are most important. In addition, the lack of data show-
ing the efficacy of particular medical services or drugs-at all or for
people of different ages, genders, and ethnicities-makes it difficult to
agree upon priorities for public spending on healthcare within entitle-
ment programs related to medical care. With this disagreement among
policymakers, judges, and the scientific community about health priori-
ties, the door is open to shift prioritization to the judgment of individuals
in need of "medical care."
Although the Social Security Act passed programs to help those in
need with cash payments through the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) programs, President Roosevelt's desire to pass national health-
care legislation never took shape. Many scholars blame the opposition of
employers, the unions, or the doctors, but the main reason that healthcare
reform failed then and may be repealed now is that the public has never
defined national, compulsory healthcare as a need.177 As Paul Starr
wrote in one of his historical accounts of health reform, "Americans are
still at odds over the most basic question about health care: whether it is
a requirement for a free life that the community has an obligation to
provide or a good that needs to be earned (and if you can't earn it, too
bad for you)." 17
The caveat here is that these valuable benefits that Americans
"earn" through employment are subsidized by vast amounts of foregone
tax revenue, as discussed above. Employers' deduction of health insur-
175 Sandra R. Levitsky, "What Rights?" The Construction of Pol. Claims to Am. Health
Care Entitlements, 42 LAW & Soc'y REV. 551, 551 (2008) (quoting SOLVING AMERICA'S
HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 301-14 (Erik Eckholm ed., 1993)).
176 Id. at 552-53 ("Claims involving the duties and obligations of care-including care for
young children, the sick, and the elderly-are rarely advanced in this country by relying on the
discourse of rights.").
177 DANIEL S. HIRSHFIELD, THE LOST REFORM: THE CAMPAIGN FOR COMPULSORY
HEALTH INS. IN THE U.S. FROM 1932-1943 43, 66-70 (1970) ("The more fundamental cause
was the lack of any broadly based pubic feeling that medical care needed a reform as drastic as
compulsory health insurance seemed to be.").
178 STARR, supra note 15, at 24.
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ance premiums paid is a tax expenditure. Employees' use of pretax
funds for a 401(k) or flexible spending account is also a tax expenditure.
Yet this false dichotomy of benefits that workers earn and public entitle-
ments that the government provides persists. I will here discuss the two-
track social welfare system and the challenge it poses for healthcare re-
form to demonstrate the difficulty in defining American healthcare pri-
orities and acting accordingly to fulfill those needs.
The two-track social welfare system that came from the New Deal
is still with us today. Social insurance policies (such as Social Security
or Medicare) are national benefits "earned" through work, and "public
assistance policies" (including AFDC or its successor "welfare" pro-
gram, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF) are controlled
locally and subject African-Americans to discrimination. 7 9 In 1976,
Ronald Reagan brought the idea of the welfare queen to the forefront in
the national debate over entitlement programs, saying in a campaign
speech, "She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to col-
lect food stamps, Social Security, veterans' benefits for four nonexistent
deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax-free cash income
alone has been running $150,000 a year."s0
Most Americans support the general idea that the government has
an important role to play in helping those in need, but "[i]n large mea-
sure, Americans hate welfare because they view it as a program that re-
wards the undeserving poor."'"' Today, "welfare" typically refers to
state need-based programs and the federal and state run TANF. Ameri-
cans wrongly believe that most people on welfare are African-American
and that African-Americans are poor because they do not work hard
enough.'8 2
The public falsely believes that African-Americans constitute a
larger percentage of the poor and welfare recipients than they do.'s3
Poverty became "racialized" in the 1960s after African-Americans mi-
179 ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, RACE AND THE LIMITS OF SOLIDARITY: AM. WELFARE STATE
DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23-46 (Sanford F. Schram et al., eds., 2003)
("While regular workers gained nationally protected social rights through an expanding social
insurance regime, African Americans were disproportionately relegated to weaker, partial, and
fragmented links with the welfare state through public assistance. Thus entering the post-
World War II era, the United States had a two-track welfare state with a strong racial valence
essentially built into its institutional structure, the legacy of the configuration of racial rule that
structured social politics in the 1930s.").
180 Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, The "Welfare Queen" is a Lie, THE ATLANTIC, Sept.
28, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/09/welfare-queen-myth/501470/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (discussing how welfare policy has since been defined by the myth
of the welfare queen and resulted in a wasteful focus on a problem that doesn't exist).
181 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANs HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE PoLIrIcs
oF ANTIPOVERTY POLY 3 (1999).
182 Id. at 3, 61-67.
183 Id. at 102.
REDEFINING "MEDICAL CARE"
grated in large numbers from the south to northern cities and as they
made up an increasing percentage of welfare recipients after years of
exclusion from and disparate treatment by these programs. The civil
rights movement's focus on economic equality also connected race and
poverty.18 4 Finally, the association of poverty with race is a result of the
"news media's tendency to use pictures of poor blacks in unsympathetic
poverty stories and pictures of poor whites in sympathetic stories."1 s5
The American picture of need is therefore clouded by a view that
the connection to work is what justifies protection from the hazards of
life. Issues of race and class are of course bound up in this assessment.
It has prevented support for universal healthcare or a health insurance
mandate from reaching a level sufficient to sustain and grow a new pro-
gram like the ACA.
When asked how much responsibility the government has for pro-
viding medical care, only three percent of Americans said that the gov-
ernment has no responsibility. Yet, Americans were much less likely
than Germans, Italians, and the British to say that this is an essential
responsibility of government.'8 6 Although there were about 50 million
uninsured Americans in 2010 when the ACA was passed,' 8 7 most Ameri-
cans with employment-based health insurance like that insurance.' 8 8
They like that insurance because it feels like a reward for hard work
instead of a government handout, and they do not see why others should
receive government funding for healthcare when they instead work hard
and pay for it themselves.
Under the Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP), members use a Personal
Wellness and Responsibility (POWER) account to pay the first $2,500 of
covered medical expenses during the year. The debit card associated
with the account does not apply to co-payments. "Members must make
copayments out of pocket."' 89 When costs exceed $2,500, HIP Basic
members are still responsible for co-payments, while members in the
HIP Plus program no longer need to pay co-payments. The money taken
from the account to pay for qualified medical expenses is largely paid for
by the State, except that members are required to contribute (or have
their employers or a non-profit contribute for them).
184 Id. at 104-11.
185 See id. at 111-32.
186 Id. at 26, tbl. 1.1. The pattern holds true for adequate housing, where only five percent
of Americans said the government has no responsibility, but Americans were much less likely
to say that it is an essential responsibility.
187 STARR, supra note 15, at 1.
188 Roth, supra note 12.
189 Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Healthy Indiana Plan FAQs,
IN.Gov, http://www.in.gov/fssalhip/2452.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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Members' contributions to their POWER accounts in Indiana are
determined by income and family size but are "approximately 2 percent
of annual family income." 90 Members with incomes above the poverty
level who fail to make required payments to their accounts will be re-
moved from the health insurance program and subject to a six month
lock-out period.19 ' Those with incomes below the poverty line will be
switched to the HIP Basic plan, without vision or dental coverage, where
they will be required to make co-payments when visiting the doctor or
hospital. 192
One study showed that one-third of those eligible for Indiana's HIP
2.0 Plan, which encompasses both the HIP Plus and HIP Basic plans,
who apply do not enroll because they fail to make a premium payment.
Approximately 30,000 people eligible for a sixty day period did not en-
roll at all. In fact, "[eighty-four] percent of people who were bumped
from HIP Plus to HIP Basic for nonpayment said they had been confused
about the payment process and the program in general."l 9 3
Recognizing that any Republican replacement for or modification of
the ACA is likely to involve individual accounts, I think the focus needs
to be on using the funds for items other than premium payments for those
who qualify for Medicaid. This focus on individual responsibility fails to
take into account all of the other items that the poor or near poor need to
spend money on outside of premiums. Health-related expenses for the
poor include not only co-payments but healthy food and physical activi-
ties that prevent illness.
B. Pooled Insurance v. Consumer-Driven Health Plans
Employees have seen a shift in recent years to defined contribution
individual accounts, including in health financing. I describe this move-
ment in my article Overvaluing Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
while advocating for the use by employees of the tax-subsidized funds
that employers contribute to these accounts to purchase health insurance
on the ACA exchanges. Employees would have plenty of choice if the
government reduced attachment to employer-sponsored health insurance
and encouraged purchases on the exchanges, increasing the number of
consumers on the exchanges dramatically and varying their risk pro-
190 Id.
191 Id. ("Members with incomes above the poverty level, for example $12,060 a year for
an individual, $16,240 for a couple or $24,600 for a family of four in 2017, that choose not to
make their POWER account contributions will be removed from the program and not be al-
lowed to re-enroll for six months. This enrollment lockout will not apply if the member is
medically frail or residing in a domestic violence shelter or in a state-declared disaster area.").
192 Id.
193 Semuels, supra note 169.
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file.1 9 4 A brief description here will suffice to place HSAs in their
proper context within the broader movement towards individual ac-
counts, one that Republicans have wholeheartedly embraced. Then, I
will focus on the tension between this focus on individual accounts and
the tradition of pooled insurance.
Individual accounts, whether used to fund retirement benefits or
health benefits, are popular because they "fit with the American narrative
of individual choice and ownership."195 Employees with accounts have
more choice about how to spend the employer's healthcare contributions,
for example, and can stretch their dollars by spending carefully and ra-
tioning their healthcare.1 9 6 Through high deductibles, co-payments, and
co-insurance, however, employers have slowly been shifting healthcare
costs to employees without the additional contributions to individual ac-
counts required to fund these new expenses. Regardless of the wisdom
of using indirect tax spending to address healthcare needs in this country,
one thing is clear: "Americans have increasingly been exposed to tax-
favored individual accounts that allow them to own and control their so-
cial welfare benefits."l 9 7
In the 1980s, Congress developed "cafeteria plans" through Internal
Revenue Code section 125, allowing employees to choose whether to
receive taxable income or purchase benefits using pre-tax funds. Em-
ployees used FSAs to defray the cost of co-payments, deductibles, and
co-insurance from their health insurance plans, although the funds were
forfeitable if not used by the end of the year. 19 8
194 Roth, supra note 12, at 667-76.
195 Id. at 668 (citing EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY:
HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AM. 5-30 (2007)) (discussing why
individual accounts are popular in spite of the shift of risk that the money will fall short of
employees' needs to the employees from the employers); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and
Peril of Ownership Soc'y Health Care Pol'y, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 778 (2006) ("The owner-
ship society generally refers to a society in which individual ownership of assets is encouraged
and where individuals are 'in control of their own lives and destinies' and not dependent on
handouts." (citation omitted)).
196 But see Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems
with Theory and Practice in Health Ins. Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 499-500 (2004)
(arguing that individual accounts force employees to decide how much and what type of
healthcare to spend their funds on and to bear the consequences of poor decisions or bad luck);
see also BEATRIX HOFFMAN, HEALTH CARE FOR SOME: RIGHTS AND RATIONING IN THE U.S.
SINCE 1930 195 (2012) (describing how President Bush sought to have consumers curtail med-
ical spending through high deductible health plans).
197 See Roth, supra note 12, at 670 ("[H]ealth insurance coverage and the tax system have
been deeply entangled for more than half a century. This co-dependence has been expanded
substantially during the past several decades with an exponential growth in complexity."
(quoting Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 73, 75 (2009))).
198 ZELINSKY, supra note 195, at 159; Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, Tax Law as
Health Pol'y: A History of Cafeteria Plans 1978-1985, 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1989).
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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
created the medical savings account (MSA), based on the individual re-
tirement account (IRA), which allowed a self-employed individual or
employees of small employers with fifty or less employees to make tax-
deductible contributions to the accounts and use the funds to purchase
"high deductible" health insurance. As the HSA/HDHP combination
took over, no new MSAs could be established after December 31,
2007.199
Insurance companies built on the MSA to lobby for a new vehicle
called a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA) in 2001, which is an-
other employer-funded method of reimbursing employees' health costs.
An HRA can reimburse regular expenses until they reach a certain
threshold and then a health insurance plan kicks in. An employer who
self-insures can cover all health expenses through the HRA, but this is
not typical. 200
Individual accounts, or defined contribution plans, such as those
discussed above, are also known as CDHPs. Although individuals like
the idea of managing their own health expenses, some scholars have
questioned whether employees can or will make reasoned choices about
how to use these accounts. 20 1 My previous work addresses how rational-
ity with respect to health insurance purchases is bounded by tax subsidies
and path dependence from the historical dominance of the employer-
sponsored health insurance model, but these concerns are muted if we
take the growth of individual accounts and HSAs specifically as a base-
line and look for ways to address concerns using these tax-favored
vehicles.
Similarly, one main critique of individual accounts is that employ-
ees using them pay more for their healthcare than employees using other
insurance arrangements. Employers have been able to shift some of the
risk of rising medical costs to employees using these accounts. 202 How-
ever, if we take the use of these accounts as the major component of
healthcare reform in the Trump administration to be a given, then we
199 See ZELINSKY, supra note 195, at 60-61; Roth, supra note 12, at 680 n.175.
200 See Roth, supra note 12, at 673-74 nn.177-82.
201 See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Ins., 54 U. KAN.
L. REv. 73, 129-31 (2005) (discussing concerns that consumers are not fully informed about
medical decisions, place too much weight on physician recommendations, and will be making
important decisions during medical crises when indicating that poor decision-making will do
great harm).
202 See id. at 119-20 ("While promising consumers a broader choice of providers and
greater control over their medical decisions, consumer-driven plans promise employers cost
savings flowing from the combination of greater efficiency in the purchasing decisions of cost-
conscious consumers and a shifting of health-care costs to employees."); Amy B. Monahan,
Employers as Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 751, 756 (2014).
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must focus on how these vehicles can be improved to address important
social concerns.
One key purpose of the movement for personal responsibility in
healthcare spending is to educate individual consumers of medical care,
which is especially important if we are concerned both with their deci-
sions regarding what and how much healthcare to "buy" and their satis-
faction with outcomes. Patients might demand unnecessary care far less
often if they were educated on its lack of efficacy or even negative im-
pact on health. 2 0 3 Wendy Mariner argued in 1994 that "it will be impor-
tant to avoid coercing the patient into choosing the least expensive form
of care when that would not be appropriate for the patient." 20 Yet reli-
ance on individual accounts shows that this country, or some portion of it
at least, is now comfortable with forcing patients to make medical deci-
sions based on their account balances-as long as catastrophic expenses
are covered. I think it is safe to assume that those making healthcare
policy over the next few years will not worry about forcing patients to
choose the least expensive care.
The problem with the movement towards CDHPs is that those with
expensive medical conditions are no longer subsidized by the healthy-
as they are through traditional insurance plans. Without forcing the
healthy to have health insurance, such as through the individual and em-
ployer mandates in the ACA, the cost of health insurance premiums in-
creases and more healthy individuals leave as the death spiral continues.
The Republicans have so far not found a way to reconcile their goal of
freedom over the decision of whether or not to have health insurance and
how to spend funds allocated for that purpose with this need to subsidize
risky and expensive healthcare consumers. My proposal is to first focus
CDHPs and spending for the social determinants of health on expenses
below the HDHP threshold for HSAs. If there is no health insurance
mandate, then the government will face higher costs for those whose
insurance it subsidizes as the healthy exit the market. Yet any of the new
administration's proposals are likely to increase costs because of a failure
to impose a mandate. My proposal is one experiment that could result in
significant cost savings and economic expansion.
CONCLUSION
Individual accounts such as HSAs are seen as the solution to the
stigma of entitlements-which are viewed by many Americans as
unearned government handouts that are also unlimited in scope since all
203 Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and Limi-
tations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 43-44 (1994).
204 Id. at 45 (adding that incentives for physicians to limit the cost of care complicate this
analysis).
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who qualify can receive them. Forcing individuals to make rational deci-
sions about how to spend the money in the accounts to best improve their
lives can be a good thing, as long as the government provides money to
those with empty accounts and the money can be used for items outside
of the traditional range of clinical care. In the future, the amounts pro-
vided could increase for all or be increased substantially for those with
lower incomes. Regardless, this would be a health spending tool that by
targeting individual needs would substantially improve population health
because of its reliance on addressing the social determinants of health.
